Russia’s future isn’t just a question of succession — it’s a stress test. Of Russia’s entire future as a country. As Dr Sarah ‘Sally’ Paine explains, Vladimir Putin has built is not a resilient system but a highly personalised one. Power is concentrated, institutions are hollowed out, and loyalty matters more than competence. That makes the question of what comes after Putin unavoidable — and potentially explosive.When that centre of gravity disappears, Russia is unlikely to experience an orderly transition. Elite factions, security services, regional strongmen, and oligarchic interests will all compete to fill the vacuum. The risk is not immediate democratisation, but fragmentation, paralysis, or a sharper form of authoritarianism driven by fear rather than control.For Europe, this isn’t a theoretical exercise. A destabilised Russia would pose risks very different from today’s: unsecured nuclear assets, erratic decision-making, regional breakaway pressures, and unpredictable foreign policy behaviour. Waiting to react after the fact would be a strategic failure. Planning for contingencies — including prolonged instability — is essential.At the same time, Russia’s external position is already changing. Its isolation from the West has pushed it into deeper dependence on China, but this is not a partnership of equals. Beijing is playing a long game — pragmatic, transactional, and unsentimental. As Russia weakens, China’s leverage grows.Energy dependence, technology gaps, capital shortages, and diplomatic isolation all tilt the balance. Moscow may speak the language of strategic alignment, but the reality increasingly resembles junior-partner status. Sovereignty erodes not through invasion, but through necessity.History matters here. Relationships between great powers are rarely stable when one side becomes structurally weaker. Understanding how China has managed asymmetrical partnerships in the past offers clues to where this is heading.