Russia (and the USSR before it) has always placed great emphasis on its missile and rocket forces. Whether the threat to be countered was NATO aircraft, shipping, or ground targets, the Russian military has always looked to relatively advanced missile systems as the answer. And so, when the February invasion opened, many observers expected Russia to commence its campaign with a barrage of modern cruise and ballistic missiles, the famous Kalibr and Iskander missiles, destroying Ukrainian command and communications infrastructure. Instead, what followed was a relatively limited campaign the achieved, at best, the temporary suppression of the Ukrainian air forces and air defences. As the war evolved however, Russia broadened its list of targets and started inflicting a greater toll on Ukrainian targets. For their part, the Ukrainians introduced their own new family of missiles – the GLMRS of HIMARS fame. In this video I look at that initial missile campaign, the way the campaign evolved subsequently, and what lessons other countries might take from the war to date. I also address the question of sustainability – is Russia running out of these precision munitions, and to what extent do their production facilities have the ability to compensate. One thing I do want to say as well, is that while I try and take a reasonably detached look at issues like this, I want to make clear that discussing the performance of these systems shouldn’t take away from recalling the very real human impact of their use, particularly against civilian targets or in built up areas. Apologies for the late upload – wasn’t well earlier this week and it pushed my recording window back. Patreon:https://www.patreon.com/PerunAUTimestamps:00:00:00 — Opening Words00:00:31 — Russia’s Most Feared Conventional Weapons00:01:57 — What Am I Covering?00:02:45 — Doctrine & History00:03:03 — Historic Aerospace Talent00:04:25 — Soviet Rocketry and Missile Programs00:05:42 — Rocketry as a Response00:08:14 — A Rocket and Missile Force00:09:14 — Doctrine and Usage00:10:41 — The Competing Forces00:10:58 — The Cutting Edge00:13:31 — The Kalibr Showpiece00:15:11 — The Old00:16:34 — The Improvised00:18:47 — Ukraine – the Old, the New, and yet to come00:22:08 — Missile Use In Ukraine00:22:16 — The Opening Salvos00:24:22 — Escalation00:25:42 — Send in the Museum Pieces00:27:52 — Note on Targeting00:30:15 — The Rebuttal00:33:13 — Performance Observations00:33:28 — Reliability and Performance00:36:50 — Targeting and Accuracy00:41:18 — Ukrainian use of GMLRS00:43:59 — Sustainability?00:44:08 — “They’re running out”00:45:39 — Evaluating the Thesis00:49:35 — Production Capacity00:52:53 — So is this Sustainable?00:54:54 — Lessons for the others00:55:03 — ISR is Central00:57:14 — Consumption Rates00:58:42 — Capability Requirements01:01:45 — Potential Importance01:03:13 — Conclusion01:04:34 — Channel Update
Cruise & ballistic missiles in Ukraine – effectiveness, lessons (and are the Russians running out?)
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