All metal, no manpower – Russian infantry shortages and mobilisation in Ukraine

General

When we think of Russia, we tend to think of the great “Russian Steamroller” of the Russian Empire or Soviet Union, with their enormous (by European standards of the time) populations and huge potential to throw large numbers of troops into battle. But, and I know I say this a lot:Russia is not the Soviet Union. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not the kind of conflict the Russian army has prepared for. The army is being asked to fight at essentially peacetime strength, leaving behind its conscripts and not calling up the larger class of its reserves. That has left the Russian army short staffed and, critically, lacking infantry to support the number of tanks and armoured vehicles it has deployed. How that has influenced the fighting is uncertain, but it does seem to have contributed to the loss of unsupported armour, and a real difficulty in taking urban and fortified areas. In their place, Russia has inserted national guard troops, mercenaries, and huge numbers of proxy-forces from the DPR and LPR.In this video we look at the importance of infantry, even on a battlefield dominated by advanced vehicles and systems, examine the roots of the Russian deficit, and also have a look at how Russia is trying to get around this issue. In doing so, we’re also going to tackle a number of myths and questions regarding Russian manpower in Ukraine. Ever wondered how Russia can apparently outnumber Ukraine in the Donbass despite Ukraine mobilising reservists or why people claim there are tends or hundreds of thousands of conscripts with WW2 equipment fighting for Russia? We’re going to talk about the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and try to answer some of those questions. I will not be covering Ukrainian mobilisation this episode, if only because it has its own, almost diametrically opposite strengths and weaknesses and a totally different force design behind it.My thanks to the many sources covering this topic – particularly the venerable Michael Kofman whose work on Russian force structures was critical to this piece.

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