13 Mar: Ukrainians RUIN A MAJOR RUSSIAN ATTACK | War in Ukraine Explained

General

Day 383: March 13Last time we talked about the Kupiansk region, I told you that Russian forces breached the Ukrainian defense in Hrianykivka and started moving south along the river in an attempt to clear the eastern bank and secure their flanks before they moved in more forces for an attack on Kupiansk. I also told you that the main idea of such actions is to cut supplies to the Kyslivka group and collapse the front line towards the Oskil River.Ukrainians started evacuation from Kupiansk because Russians launched heavy artillery preparation and destroyed and damaged many civilian areas. However, Russian forces were unable to capitalize on this artillery preparation as they visibly got stuck in the forest. Russians tried to move towards the outer edges of the forest but could not secure any gains due to mines and artillery strikes. As Ukrainians know where they planted mines, they continue assaulting Russian positions in the forest. Recent reports suggest that once Russians entered Lyman Pershyi, which was previously in the grey zone, Ukrainians started increasingly targeting this settlement. Even the fights in Hrianykivka continue to this day because Ukrainians launch assaults from Dvorichna through the forest.Securing this flank is a necessity for Russians, otherwise, they cannot deploy additional troops to conduct an offensive towards Kupiansk, cutting supplies to the Kyslivka group and collapsing the front line. The Institute for the Study of War commented on this situation and stated that in order to threaten the city, Russians need to advance 13km cross-country rapidly, and the failure to secure their gains in the forest showed that they do not have the capacity to do it. Ukrainian General Staff concluded that the only objective that Russians are achieving here is fixing Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction and preventing Ukrainian forces from transferring personnel to other areas in Ukraine.As you remember, Putin ordered to defeat Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and capture Luhansk and Donetsk regions by March. Judging by what has happened, Russian forces tried to breach Ukrainian defense in Vuhledar to disperse Ukrainian troops, take Bakhmut, and then commit their resources to take Kupiansk and Lyman. The almost unnoticeable changes to the front line make many doubt that the offensive operation happened at all. However, the engagement of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions on this front line indicates the Russian winter offensive happened, Ukrainian forces just prevented Russians from securing significant gains.Donetsk People’s Republic commander Khodakovsky questioned whether Russian forces are prepared for the coming Ukrainian counteroffensive operations after “getting carried away by Bakhmut [and] Vuhledar” and suggested that Russian forces may have set conditions for Ukrainian counteroffensives by heavily expending combat power and resources on these operations.The conventional Russian military recently massed and lost significant numbers of mobilized personnel for a since-culminated offensive push near Vuhledar. The marine brigades were even merged together due to losses. Russian major offensives in the Luhansk region failed to generate any significant results. And Russians are still fighting in Bakhmut. The Institute for the Study of War estimates that the culmination of Russia’s current three offensive efforts will likely allow Ukrainian forces to launch counteroffensives anywhere along the frontline.It looks like Putin has overestimated the Russian military’s own capabilities and the extent to which mobilized soldiers will play a role. Given the current state of the Russian army, the most realistic plan would have required anywhere from 6 to 12 months of several phases of successful Russian campaigning.As of now, the intensity of fights remains high only around Kreminna and Bakhmut, which implies that the Russian offensive has prematurely culminated. And Russian forces’ culmination could generate favorable conditions for Ukrainian forces to exploit in their own late spring or summer counteroffensive after incorporating Western deliveries of weapons and newly built and trained assault formations.

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